Exploring how power grid operators handle shortages using "Scarcity Pricing", based on the paper "Reserve and energy scarcity pricing in United States power markets: A comparative review of principles and practices" by Mehrtash, Hobbs, and Ela.
Imagine the electric grid as a giant, complex balancing act. At every single moment, the amount of electricity generated must exactly match the amount consumed. If there's too little power, you get blackouts. Too much, and equipment can be damaged. Grid operators work constantly to maintain this balance.
But what happens when things go wrong? A power plant might unexpectedly shut down. Demand might surge during a heatwave. Clouds might suddenly block the sun, reducing solar power output. To handle these surprises, grid operators keep some power plants ready in reserve, like a spare tire for your car. This backup is called Operating Reserve.
When these reserves start running low, the grid is in a state of scarcity. It's a warning sign that the system is stressed and blackouts are more likely. How should the electricity market react? This is where Scarcity Pricing comes in. It's a way for grid operators to signal this scarcity by administratively increasing the price of electricity and reserves. These higher prices encourage generators to produce more power (if possible) and motivate large consumers to use less electricity.
Different regions in the U.S. have different ways of implementing scarcity pricing. With the rise of renewable energy sources like wind and solar (which have near-zero fuel costs), these administrative scarcity prices are becoming increasingly important for setting market prices and ensuring the grid remains reliable. This post explores the core ideas and differences in these approaches, using interactive visualizations to build intuition.
Operating reserves are crucial for reliability. They come in different flavors, based on how quickly they can respond:
When reserves are plentiful, their "value" in the market might be low – just the cost of having a power plant ready but not producing much energy. But as the amount of available reserves dwindles, the risk to the grid increases. The "value" of that last remaining megawatt (MW) of reserve becomes much higher because it might be the only thing preventing a blackout.
Market designers represent this changing value using an Operating Reserve Demand Curve (ORDC). It's not a demand curve in the traditional sense (consumers deciding how much to buy), but rather an administrative curve set by the grid operator. It defines the price (or penalty) the system is willing to pay for reserves based on how much is available.
Here's a simplified, conceptual ORDC. Drag the slider to change the amount of available reserves and see how the "scarcity price" changes. Notice that as reserves get very low, the price shoots up dramatically.
Scarcity Price: $0 / MWh
This is a conceptual illustration. Real ORDCs have specific shapes and steps defined by market rules.The paper groups the methods used by U.S. Independent System Operators (ISOs) / Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) into three main categories:
Texas (ERCOT) uses a unique approach. They run their main real-time energy market first *without* explicitly including reserve demand curves. After the market clears and energy prices (Locational Marginal Prices, or LMPs) are determined based on generator offers, they calculate a separate Price Adder. This adder reflects the scarcity level and is added *on top* of the energy LMP.
The adder calculation is based on two key concepts:
Roughly speaking, the adder is calculated as: $Adder \approx LOLP \times (VOLL - Energy LMP)$. As reserves ($R$) decrease, $LOLP$ increases, pushing the adder up towards the $VOLL$. If reserves fall below a critical threshold ($R_{req}$), the adder jumps straight to $VOLL - Energy LMP$.
Calculated Adder: $0 / MWh
Final Energy Price (LMP + Adder): $50 / MWh
Note: The LOLP calculation uses a simplified curve shape for illustration, based roughly on Fig 1 & 2 from the paper. Real calculations involve probability distributions of forecast errors.Most other ISOs (like PJM, MISO, CAISO, NYISO, ISO-NE, SPP) use a different approach. They co-optimize energy and reserves simultaneously. This means the market clearing process considers both the cost of producing energy *and* the value of holding reserves at the same time. They achieve this by building stepwise ORDCs directly into the market model.
These ORDCs typically have several steps. At high reserve levels, the penalty (price) is low. As reserves decrease past certain thresholds, the penalty jumps up in steps. The highest step usually corresponds to a maximum penalty value (often related to the energy offer cap, e.g., $1000/MWh or $2000/MWh, though sometimes higher like MISO's $3500/MWh).
Scarcity Price (Penalty): $0 / MWh
This example shows a generic 3-step ORDC. Real ISOs have varying numbers of steps, prices, and quantities based on their specific rules (see Table 1 in the paper).A key feature in these co-optimized markets is nesting. This means higher-quality, faster-responding reserves (like Regulation or Spinning) can also satisfy the requirements for lower-quality reserves (like Non-Spinning or 30-minute reserves). If there's a shortage of, say, Non-Spinning reserve, the market might use more expensive Spinning reserve to fill the gap. This causes the scarcity price for Non-Spinning to effectively "add up" with the price for Spinning, leading to potentially very high prices for the highest-quality reserves during severe shortages.
The paper further divides the stepwise ORDC approach based on whether the market includes the newer Flexiramp product:
The different assumptions and methods used by ISOs lead to significantly different scarcity prices under the same physical conditions. The paper presents a numerical example (Section 4) to illustrate this. Let's explore a simplified, interactive version inspired by Figure 11.
Imagine a system with 50 GW of generation capacity facing a 40 GW load. This leaves 10 GW of potential reserves. However, let's assume a minimum contingency reserve requirement of 3 GW must always be met. The chart below shows how the scarcity premium added to the energy price might vary as the *actual* available reserves (total capacity minus load) change, according to the rules of different ISOs.
Use the dropdown menu to select different ISO approaches and drag the slider to see how the scarcity premium changes. Notice the differences in:
Selected ISO Premium: $
Note: Curves are based on simplified interpretations of ISO rules described in the paper and its Table 1/Section 4 assumptions (e.g., 3 GW min contingency reserve, $50/MWh base LMP, $1000 or $2000 offer caps where applicable, VOLL=$5000 for ERCOT, simplified flexiramp effects). Nesting effects are included by summing relevant penalties. Actual prices are highly situation-dependent. / MWhAs the simulation shows, ERCOT's VOLL-based adder leads to the highest prices during extreme scarcity. CAISO, with a lower energy offer cap (in the base case scenario), shows lower peak prices. Markets with flexiramp (CAISO, SPP, MISO) tend to show prices rising earlier (longer right tail) compared to those without (PJM, NYISO, ISO-NE). The exact shapes and step locations vary significantly based on each ISO's specific parameter choices.
The paper's sensitivity analysis (Section 4.3) confirms what the comparison suggests: the biggest driver of differences between the ORDCs is the penalty level chosen for severe scarcity (e.g., the VOLL or the highest penalty step). The number and size of the steps, and whether flexiramp is included, also play significant roles.
So, what makes a "good" scarcity pricing mechanism? The authors conclude that an effective ORDC should ideally have three features:
Getting scarcity pricing right is crucial. As our grid relies more on variable renewables, these mechanisms will increasingly determine not just reliability, but also the economic signals for investment in new generation, storage, and demand response. The significant differences across U.S. markets highlight an ongoing evolution in market design, striving to balance reliability and economic efficiency in a changing power system.